I study a model of dynamic policy making in which citizens do not have complete knowledge of how policies are mapped into outcomes. They learn about the mapping through repeated elections as policies are implemented and outcomes observed. I characterize for this environment the policy trajectory with impatient voters. I find that through experimentation good policies are frequently found.
Introduction
Throughout history, the search for good policies has been guided by trial-and-error. From laissez-faire to the New Deal, from tradeable pollution permits to financial deregulation, policy makers have experimented with policy in the hope of improving outcomes. Policy makers are aided in these endeavors by the ability to learn from their experience -from both successes and failures -to guide future choices. This learning dynamic was evident even in the monetarism experiment of 1979, for although monetarism itself was abandoned after three years, the experiment revealed valuable information about the macro-economy that guided subsequent policy (Benjamin Friedman 1984) .
The objective of this paper is to study the challenges posed by policy making in an uncertain and dynamic world. In particular, the paper seeks to provide answers to such questions as: When do policy makers experiment with policy and when do they settle for what is known? When do they make radical changes to policy and when are changes incremental? Where in the policy space do policy makers search for good policies? How much is learned from the policy experience? And, in particular, does the search process identify good policies?
To answer these questions I develop a model of repeated two-candidate elections in a single dimensional policy space. The key ingredient of the model is that citizens -voters and candidates -have imperfect information about how policies are transformed into outcomes. Thus, finding the policy that delivers the desired outcome is not straightforward. Aiding the policy making process is the ability to learn from experience. In each period the winner of the election implements his campaign promise and the outcome is observed (and experienced). If the policy choice is experimental (not previously tried) its outcome reveals whether the policy is itself good and also provides information about the likely outcomes of other policy alternatives. Citizens update their beliefs accordingly and use the information to predict the outcomes of other policies, guiding their future choices. I characterize for this environment with impatient voters the optimal choice of policy in each period and describe the policy trajectory. 1 A novelty of the model is the specification of the policy process. I represent the mapping from policies to outcomes by the realized path of a Brownian motion, where citizens know the parameters of the motion (the drift and variance) but not the path. Although used in a non-standard manner -with policies acting as the independent variable -the Brownian motion captures many realistic properties of policy making and does so in a highly tractable form. In particular, the Brownian structure endows citizens with the ability to order policies along the standard liberal-conservative continuum according to expected outcomes but not according to realized outcomes. That is, citizens know which policies are more likely to deliver liberal (or conservative) outcomes but do not know which policies do deliver liberal outcomes. This distinction captures Merton's (1936) famous Law of Unintended Consequences and a key risk of policy making: that in attempting to improve outcomes, policy makers may actually make things worse.
The equilibrium trajectory of policy choices is path-dependent in this environment, varying in the outcomes realized as citizens progressively learn about the policy process. I find that the search process often leads to good policies, where what is considered good-enough emerges endogenously during play and depends on how well the underlying issue is understood. More strikingly, I show that a good policy is not always found and I identify the possibility for policy making to get stuck at less desirable outcomes. In fact, I show that policy making can get stuck at policies that deliver any outcome, including outcomes arbitrarily distant from those preferred by voters.
Getting stuck represents a novel failure of policy making. It is a failure that is purely informational and does not rely on the presence of special interests, asymmetric information, or agency problems. It depends crucially on the ability to learn from the policy making experience and requires at least three policies to be available (and thus it is precluded in binary policy models). Policy gets stuck when what citizens learn from their experience is discouraging. In fact, even though citizens still believe that a good policy exists, they get stuck because they have learned that finding one is difficult and this deters them from experimenting further.
The model also provides insight into policy dynamics. When voters choose to experiment, the nature of their choices passes through two distinct phases: a monotonic phase followed by a triangulating phase. The phases differ in how voters react to the experience of previous choices -how successes and failures are interpreted -and this leads to differences in the size and direction of policy experiments across the phases. In the monotonic phase little is known about the underlying policy issue and experimentation is large and bold. Moreover, the failure of individual policies in this phase do not cause policy to be reversed and the policy trajectory moves monotonically across the policy space. In the triangulating phase, in contrast, more is known about the underlying issue and experiments are smaller and with frequent reversals in direction.
For most of the paper the model of political competition is deliberately simple and held constant. I relax this in Section 4 to address the question of how political incentives interact with learning and experimentation. I consider two simple variations of the model of politics. I first allow voter abstention and show that it biases a society away from experimenting. Second, I show how adding noise to political competition can actually improve policy making. The mechanism by which this is achieved -the noise changes the strategic environment -suggests the subtlety of experimentation in richer political contexts. The extensions offered here are only a first step in exploring this subtlety, yet they are suggestive of a direction for profitable additional work.
Related Literature
Uncertainty over the policy process has most frequently found application in one-shot models of politics. In binary policy models, Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) show how inefficiencies arise when the identities of a policy's beneficiaries are ex-ante unknown (see also Mitchell and Moro 2006), Dewatripont and Roland (1995) consider the optimal sequencing of reforms, and Majumdar and Mukand (2004) study policy signaling by incumbents. 2 None of these sources of inefficiency are present in my model.
Policy uncertainty is also at the heart of expertise in policy making. Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987) show how policy uncertainty affects the delegation of authority in legislatures, and Schultz (1996) develops a model of elections in which expert candidates communicate with voters. Tailored to one-shot games, however, the non-expert's uncertainty in these settings is limited to a single piece of information, which in a dynamic environment induces full revelation of the policy mapping after the first period. In contrast, the richness of the Brownian motion implies that learning is always incomplete (in countable time). 3 Most dynamic models of policy assume the mapping from policies to outcomes to be perfectly known. 4 An exception is work on boundedly-rational policy making, descended largely from Lindblom's (1959) theory of muddling through. Lindblom argues that policy should only be changed incrementally given the uncertainty of large changes. Bendor (1995) formalizes Lindblom's informal arguments, developing a model in which a binary choice is made each period between a status quo and an exogenously supplied alternative. He uses the model to, among other things, subject incrementalism to formal analysis and finds it wanting. I obtain a similar conclusion in a rational model with a continuum of policy alternatives available each period (what Lindblom calls comprehensiveness), and characterize how the optimality of incrementalism depends on where an issue is in its life-cycle. Kollman, Miller, and Page (2000) propose a related model of "structural search" that shares with the current paper the feature that outcomes from different policies are connected (although the models are otherwise different). 5 In their model policy makers search around the policy space for better policies according to some predetermined algorithm, considering a limited choice set each period. 6 I differ in that I solve for the fully rational policy choice. In addition to providing a contrast to boundedly rational results, my findings complement them by showing when particular search algorithms are optimal, thereby suggesting when a triangulating candidate or a candidate of bold change may do well. Another exception is Piketty (1995) who offers a rational model of learning that explores the relative roles of luck and skill in economic outcomes. Although sharing a focus on learning with my model, his model is otherwise distinct: he assumes uncertainty is over only a few parameters, that learning is confounded by the coarseness of outcomes (binary), and that agents make individual economic decisions as well as vote. Moreover, Piketty's focus is also different: he is interested in how heterogenous beliefs (about social mobility) persist through time, whereas in my model all players have symmetric (but incomplete) information.
The distinction between my model and Piketty's is illustrative of the principal difference between my model and those in the learning literature. In my model the world is represented as complex with much that is unknown, yet where learning about particular policies is unobstructed. In contrast, in the literature uncertainty is typically restricted to a few variables that are difficult to learn due to noise in observations (or coarse outcomes as in Piketty) . This is the case with standard bandit models and in applied settings, such as a monopolist learning his true demand function (McLennan 1984). These differences in conception produce very different learning properties, differences that will become clear as the analysis unfolds.
Specifically, modeling uncertainty as a Brownian path corresponds to a bandit problem with a continuum of correlated, deterministic arms. To the best of my knowledge, no 5 Relaxing the structural aspect of the problem, Kollman, Miller, and Page also study a model of rational but "random" search in which policies are independent and sampled from a fixed distribution. 6 Following Page (1996), Kollman et al define the difficulty of the policy problem as the number of nonlinearities in the policy process. As the Brownian path has infinite nonlinearities this definition is not applicable here. I instead view difficulty as the ratio of variance to drift of the generating Brownian process (and refer to this as issue complexity).
existing model considers such a structure. This richness allows for a continuum of policies (that permits insight into the size and direction of policy changes) and for citizens to learn across policies, learning that is precluded when the bandits are independent. To obtain tractability, this generality in policy requires a trade-off with preferences, and I assume that voters choose policy each period to maximize their immediate payoff (they discount the future entirely). 7, 8 In modeling elections this assumption is not entirely inappropriate. It is consistent with the myopia and inattention mass electorates are well-known for (see Bartels (2008) for an argument along these lines). Moreover, it provides a reasonable approximation to a forward-looking world in which policies take considerable time to implement, produce results, and be changed. That said, intertemporal incentives are surely relevant to policy making in some contexts and although the results derived here are not knife-edged, 9 extending the analysis to the case of patient voters is nevertheless of obvious interest (but also considerable difficulty). 10 
Model
In each period t = 1, 2, 3, ..., a majority rule election is held between two candidates X and Y . The candidates compete by committing to policies x t , y t ∈ R that they implement if elected. Policies produce outcomes according to a policy process, ψ. Formally, a policy process is a function that maps from the policy space to the outcome space (also single dimensional) such that: ψ : R → R. The electorate consists of an odd number of voters who care about outcomes (and indirectly about policies). Voter i's ideal outcome is o i and voters are ordered such that o i < o j for i < j. Denote the median voter by m and set o m = 0. Voters are impatient and discount the future entirely. The per period utility of voter i for policy p given outcome ψ (p) is:
Candidates have the same utility function over outcomes as do voters (although they need not be impatient). The ideal outcomes for candidates X and Y are −d and d > 0. 7 An indirect benefit of this assumption is that it clearly distinguishes my results from other models of repeated elections in which patience and reputation drive policy dynamics (e.g., Duggan 2000) . 8 This trade-off has been made by others (e.g., Piketty 1995) and delivers what is known as passive learning (in contrast to active learning when agents are patient). 9 It is straightforward to establish that for generic histories, the policy choice when patience is positive but sufficiently low is in a neighborhood of the choice characterized here. 10 For example, in a related setting Aghion et al (1991) are restricted to limit results when the horizon is infinite and discounting geometric. Candidates are motivated also by rents from office (ego or otherwise) that deliver a fixed benefit of κ > 0.
The true policy process ψ is determined randomly by Nature prior to period 1. I model ψ as the realized path of a Brownian motion of drift μ and variance σ 2 . 11 Voters and candidates know the parameters of the motion but not the realized path. 12 Figure   1 depicts one possible realization of the Brownian path. To focus on learning, the same policy process is in effect for all periods. Outcomes are observed perfectly by all citizens (information is incomplete but symmetric). Citizens begin with knowledge of where they are -they observe the outcome of the status quo policy, (sq, o sq ) -but do not know the outcome for any other policies. They observe a new point in the mapping each time they experiment with policy, such that at election t they know up to t distinct points in the mapping. Let
..} be the set of known points at election t, and denote by l t and r t the left-most and right-most policies in h t , respectively.
Beliefs over untried policies depend on the set h t but not on the order policies were observed (as changing policy is costless and no policy occupies a privileged position). Beliefs for each policy depend only on the nearest policy in either direction (by the Markov property). On the flanks, therefore, beliefs are open-ended, anchored at only one end. Specifically, for all policies p > r t on the right flank, beliefs are distributed 11 Although Brownian motions are normally associated with movement through time, time plays no role in the realization of the path. Instead policy serves as the independent variable. 12 In Section 3.4 I relax the assumption that voters know the parameters of the motion.
normally with:
Expected Outcome:
Variance:
The drift parameter μ measures the expected rate of change and the variance the "noisiness" of the policy process. Beliefs on the left flank are defined analogously, replacing r t and ψ (r t ) with l t and ψ (l t ). At the first election beliefs are open-ended on either side of sq, as reflected in the constant drift line in Figure 1 . Policies between two known points in the mapping lay on a Brownian bridge. If policies q 1 and q 2 are neighbors in h t (such that no other policy in h t is in the interval [q 1 , q 2 ]) beliefs for each p ∈ [q 1 , q 2 ] are distributed normally with:
Variance :
Beliefs on a bridge represent an intuitive interpolation of the two ends. Expected outcomes are given by the straight line between the ends and are independent of the drift μ. The variance is concave over the domain, reaching its peak halfway between the ends of the bridge and equaling zero (obviously) at the ends. (Note that dvar(ψ(p)|h t ) dp = ±σ 2 at the ends of the bridge.) The Brownian motion representation of the policy mapping captures several key features of policy making. 13 • Expected vs. actual outcomes. Citizens can order policies according to expected outcomes but not according to realized outcomes. Thus, they know which policies are more likely to move outcomes in a certain direction but do not know which policies do move policy in that direction. This represents a natural generalization to uncertain environments of the classic left-right conception of policy.
• Partial invertibility. Citizens can learn across policies as the policy path is partially invertible. Observing outcomes reveals some information about untried policies but not everything, just as in practice a policy experiment informs future choice without rendering it trivial. This property holds throughout (countable) time as regardless of how many outcomes citizens observe, they never learn the mapping completely.
• Proportional invertibility. The accuracy of beliefs is increasing in the distance an untried policy is from a policy for which the outcome is known. This proportionally invertibility captures the intuition of Lindblom (1959) that greater uncertainty is incurred the more policy is moved from what is known. Proportional invertibility also implies that an experiment reveals more information (in terms of lowering variance) the more novel it is. This is consistent with Friedman's (1984) conclusion that the monetarism experiment was so informationally valuable precisely because it was so radical.
• Law of Unintended Consequences. In trying to make outcomes better, changes to policy may actually make things worse. Outcomes can overshoot their target or move in the wrong direction, capturing the original insight of Merton (1936) .
• The policy mapping is not locally learnable. Experiments in one region of the policy space -even arbitrarily many -reveal only limited information about the global policy process. For example, regardless of how well command-and-control methods of pollution abatement are understood, the effectiveness of a cap-and-trade system cannot be predicted accurately until it is tried. 14 • Issue complexity. The ratio
provides a simple measure of the complexity of the underlying policy issue. It determines how predictable an issue is and how much citizens learn from observing outcomes (complexity is increasing in
). This enables insight into how experimentation and learning varies across simple and complex issues.
• Tractability. The simplicity of Equations 1-4 combines easily with quadratic utility to create a simple mean-variance representation of utility that permits analytic results:
I restrict attention to equilibria in which voters use weakly dominant strategies and cannot abstain (abstention is relaxed in Section 4.2). Voters may be indifferent over candidates, although how ties are broken is immaterial to the results; for concreteness I assume a voter supports the candidate with greatest variance and mixes equally otherwise. For simplicity, and as is standard in models of electoral competition, I report only the strategies of candidates in describing equilibrium. Denote the equilibrium strategies of the candidates at time t by x * t and y * t .
Results
Although voters have standard preferences over outcomes, these give rise to non-standard policy preferences. The policy preferences that are generated are generally not smooth, single-peaked or of constant concavity, and they evolve through time. In many environments this leads to cycling and equilibrium nonexistence. Nevertheless, I show this is not the case here and that the median voter remains decisive for all histories. This delivers a repeated election analogue of Black's (1958) median voter theorem. 15 ) unique equilibrium is convergent: At election t platforms
Lemma 1 The (essentially
The practical effect of Lemma 1 is that policy choice is reduced to a single person decision problem. This simplifies the analysis and focuses attention on learning. It also represents the benchmark case of political competition. Proving this result -rather than modeling only a single voter -is useful in that it establishes the political relevance of the single-person results to follow. 16 The extensions of Section 4 explore how policy making is impacted when the power of the median voter is reduced (and Lemma 1 doesn't hold). Policy convergence in Lemma 1 is within period and not across periods, raising the question of whether policy choices also converge -or stabilize -through time. The next result establishes a sufficient condition for policy stability. If in any period a previously implemented policy is reused citizens learn nothing new about the policy process. Consequently, the same choice is again optimal and experimentation stops. Formally, I say that policy z is stable on the equilibrium path if for some t 0 , x * t = y * t = z for all t ≥ t 0 . Throughout this section I focus on the utility of the median voter and refer only to the strategy of candidate X under the understanding that Y 's platforms is the same.
I now turn to the equilibrium strategy, which I present constructively beginning with the opening election. 15 Uniqueness in Lemma 1 is qualified as for some non-generic realizations of ψ divergence may occur in equilibrium. For example, if through experimentation citizens were to learn that ψ (x) = −ψ (sq) for some x then it may be that the candidates diverge in equilibrium with one candidate offering policy x and the other sq. I hereafter I ignore these non-generic possibilities. 16 It also allows the model to capture public goods issues. The outcome can be interpreted as the efficiency of a public good, with all citizens having a common preference for outcome zero (representing maximum efficiency).
The First Election
The first election presents the citizenry with a basic trade-off: accept the known but imperfect status quo, or move policy in the hope of achieving a better outcome but running the risk of making things worse. Put another way, should citizens trust the devilthey-know or the devil-they-don't-know? Proposition 1 provides the answer, showing when policy choice is conservative and when risk is undertaken, and for experimentation characterizes exactly the size and direction of the policy movement. Define α = σ 2 2|μ| as half the complexity of the underlying issue.
Proposition 1
The equilibrium strategy at t = 1 is:
, where:
If the outcome from the status quo is good enough -where what is good-enough is determined endogenously -the status quo is immediately stable and no experimentation occurs in equilibrium. The stable outcome may diverge from the median voter's ideal outcome and nothing additional is learned about the underlying policy issue, yet learning is adequate in that only outcomes close to the median's ideal can be stable.
The more interesting case is when the status quo is not good enough and the optimal response is to change policy and experiment. Experimentation leads to two questions: In which direction does policy move and how far does it move? The direction is chosen to move the expected outcome toward zero. The size of change reflects a conservatism in policy making as moving the expected outcome is traded-off against greater variance. The equilibrium expected outcome is α, lying between the status quo outcome and the median voter's ideal. The left-hand panel of Figure 2 depicts the situation when o sq > 0 and μ < 0. The size of a policy experiment is increasing in the unattractiveness of the status quo outcome and decreasing in the complexity of the underlying issue. These relationships formalize the intuition that the citizenry is more willing to engage in risky policy making the more dissatisfied they are with the current state of affairs and the more they feel they understand an issue (lower complexity).
A consequence of these properties is that in equilibrium the riskiness of policy making is not monotonic in the complexity of the underlying issue. Riskiness is concave in , therefore, the chance that policy overshoots the median voter's ideal outcome is actually decreasing in issue complexity.
An interesting aspect of equilibrium behavior is that despite the candidates choosing the policy that maximizes median voter utility, it is not the median voter who most likes the policy that is implemented. Rather, it is the voter with ideal outcome ±α that has the highest expected utility from the experimental policy, with the expected utility for other voters arrayed symmetrically around her. To a naive observer, therefore, it may appear that candidates exhibit a partisan bias in their platforms where one doesn't exist.
The Second and Subsequent Elections
The structure of subsequent choices depends on whether an experimental policy was chosen in the first period and whether the outcome of the experiment is of the same sign as o sq (the same side of the median's ideal outcome). I begin with the monotonic phase in which ψ (x * 1 ) and o sq (and all subsequent outcomes) are of the same sign. For ease of exposition, and without loss of generality, I hereafter describe equilibrium behavior for μ ≤ 0 and o sq ≥ 0.
Monotonicity
The case ψ (x * 1 ) ≥ 0 is depicted in the right-hand panel of Figure 2 . It is easy to see that policies on the bridge between the known points are dominated by the end-point closer to 0 (policy sq in Figure 2 ) as this yields a more attractive expected outcome and with no risk. If experimentation is optimal, therefore, it must be on a flank and, as is the case at the first election, the right flank is preferable and the search for a good policy continues monotonically in the direction of the original movement. Given the similarity of conditions in the second period to the first period, one may conjecture that the cut-points of Proposition 1 apply again at t = 2 and thereafter. Surprisingly, this conjecture is false. The first period calculations apply again if experimentation is optimal. What changes is that the willingness of citizens to experiment may diminish. In fact, policy stability can now be induced by sufficiently bad outcomes as well as outcomes that are sufficiently good.
The logic for candidate behavior at t = 2 extends to all subsequent periods in which policy has not stabilized and previous outcomes have been of the same sign. For this to be the case policy movements must have been monotonic and I refer to this as the monotonic phase of policy making.
Definition 1 Policy making at election t is in the monotonic phase if
as the most attractive outcome realized up to election t. Equilibrium behavior in the monotonic phase is described by the following.
Proposition 2 In the monotonic phase at election t ≥ 2, the equilibrium strategy is: (i) Stable at:
(ii) Stable at:
(iii) Experimental with:
, where
Good-enough stability (part i) occurs only at the most recent policy choice, with the boundary of α holding constant throughout the monotonic phase.
The second type of stability that emerges (part ii) is rather different and when it happens I say that policy making gets stuck. The stable policy in this case is τ * t (the previous most attractive policy) and not the most recent choice. For policy to backslide in this way to a previously chosen -and discarded -policy it is necessary for the outcome at x * t−1 to have moved in the opposite direction to that anticipated. The importance of moving in the wrong direction is not that the policy will be chosen again, but that it reduces the expected utility of further experimentation. Consequently, while experimentation at time t is always preferable to a bad outcome of policy x * t−1 , it may not be preferred to other policies that had been previously implemented. 17 Policy making that is stuck represents a novel informational failure of policy making. An outcome persists that is significantly distant from the median voter's ideal and, possibly, the preferences of all voters. Moreover, this distance can be arbitrarily large. Getting stuck requires at least three policy alternatives and that voters learn from their experience, and therefore cannot occur in a binary policy model or with independent policies (independent bandits). Voters get stuck because they learn that finding a good policy is more difficult than they had thought. They still believe that a perfect policy exists with probability one, yet the newfound difficulty in finding it convinces them to abandon experimentation and to settle for a policy that they had previously discarded.
Getting stuck is distinct from other explanations of policy failure that rely on the presence of special interests, agency problems, or asymmetric information. It is also distinct from inefficiencies due to a hill-climbing algorithm. Voters here evaluate with full rationality all possible policies and are free to choose any policy at any time. Indeed, the stuck policy may very well not even be a local extrema in the actual policy process, a condition that is necessary for stability with hill-climbing algorithms (the stuck policy here is a local extrema only in expected outcome). 18 
Triangulation
The monotonic phase continues indefinitely until a policy proves stable (for any reason) or policy making over-shoots and an outcome is realized on the opposite side of the median voter's ideal outcome. In this case a Brownian bridge spans the median voter's ideal outcome and policy making transitions to the triangulating phase. The triangulating phase can begin as early as the second election and once it starts it continues until
First Period in Phase:
Second Period in Phase:
policy stabilizes. Formally, the triangulating phase is defined as follows. 
The beginning of the triangulating phase marks the end of monotonic search. Hereafter experimentation is on a spanning bridge (across zero) as all other experimental policies are dominated by known points. In fact, all subsequent experimental policies are bounded by the previous choices x * t ∆ −2 and x * t ∆ −1 and the search becomes local. The left panel of Figure 3 depicts the situation at election t ∆ .
Behavior at the beginning of the triangulating phase mimics in its simplicity that at the beginning of the monotonic phase: Stabilize at the most recent policy choice if it is good enough, otherwise continue experimenting. Despite the similarity, the trigger for stability and the amount of policy experimentation both differ from the monotonic phase. For the bridge d w · z between generic policies w and z define:
where the bracketed term in the denominator is the slope of the bridge between w and z. Formally, α ( d w · z) generalizes α by replacing μ with the slope of the bridge. Equilibrium behavior upon first entering the triangulating phase is as follows.
Proposition 3 At election t
∆ in the triangulating phase the equilibrium strategy is:
(ii) Experimental otherwise, where
The beginning of the triangulating phase establishes the second side of the political divide. This has two effects, both of which increase society's willingness to experiment. First, the spanning bridge is by construction steeper than the open-ended drift line. This increases the returns to risk and, consequently, the boundary on stability (defined implicitly in part i) is strictly tighter than in the monotonic phase. Secondly, as variance is concave across the bridge, the expected outcome of an experimental policy (defined implicitly in part ii) is more centrist again than the stability boundary in part i.
An upshot of voters' greater preference for risk is that policy making cannot get stuck at election t ∆ . As earlier policies did not prove stable at election t ∆ − 1, they cannot prove stable at t ∆ when the pay-off from experimentation is greater; thus only the most recent policy can prove stable and only because it is good enough.
If an experimental policy is chosen at t ∆ the triangulating phase continues and policy begins to oscillate between previous choices. The realization of ψ ¡ x * t ∆ ¢ breaks the spanning bridge into two new bridges, only one of which is spanning, as depicted in the right side panel of Figure 3 . As experimentation is only on a spanning bridge, this process repeats by a simple induction argument throughout the triangulating phase and in each period there is a unique spanning bridge.
Lemma 3 In the triangulating phase one and only one Brownian bridge is spanning.
This pins down the region for experimentation in each period and implies that the region narrows continuously throughout the triangulating phase. General behavior in the triangulating phase is given in Proposition 4. For election t > t ∆ , denote the endpoints of the unique spanning bridge by x * l and x * r (omitting dependence on t for simplicity) where by construction one of the ends is x * t−1 , the most recently chosen policy. Recall that policy τ * t delivers the most centrist outcome of those observed up until time t.
Proposition 4 At election t > t
(ii) Stable at
Parts (i) and (iii) are reminiscent of period t ∆ , although due to the narrowing of the spanning bridge equilibrium behavior is constantly changing. In each period policy either stabilizes or the spanning bridge gets steeper due to the concavity of variance on the bridge. As the spanning bridge is also narrowing, this implies the good-enough boundary tightens constantly throughout the triangulating phase. The standard for a good-enough outcome is not only endogenous, therefore, but is phase and time-dependent also. This is stated as Corollary 1.
Corollary 1
The boundary on good-enough stability is strictly converging throughout the triangulating phase.
The other difference between Propositions 3 and 4 is part (ii): the possibility of getting stuck. That this is possible is somewhat surprising in light of Corollary 1 and the increasing attractiveness of experimentation. The logic of getting stuck here is similar to the monotonic phase, yet the trigger is different. It can arise only for moderately bad outcomes. Very bad outcomes, in contrast, actually make experimentation more attractive in the triangulating phase, ensuring it continues.
To understand why getting stuck is possible here, it is useful to think about how voters interpret policy outcomes. In particular, what an outcome says about where a good policy is likely to be. In both phases a bad outcome leads voters to believe that a good policy is further away than they had thought. In the monotonic phase this takes them further from what they know, increasing the risk. In contrast, in the triangulating phase it takes them closer to the other end of the spanning bridge where variance is low. In effect, the bad outcome tells voters that they weren't far off with a previous choice. Policy making can get stuck, then, only when an outcome is moderately bad (when ψ (x * l ) + ψ (x * r ) is small) and a good policy is most likely near the center of the bridge where variance is at its maximum.
Stability
The triangulating phase continues indefinitely until policy making stabilizes. A remaining question is whether experimentation eventually stops. This question is not straightforward as, by Corollary 1, the bound on stability approaches zero and if it converges too quickly may not be reached with probability one. Nevertheless, Proposition 5 confirms that a stable policy emerges in equilibrium almost surely.
Proposition 5 With probability one, a stable policy appears on the equilibrium path.
This result confirms that along the equilibrium path learning eventually stops and policy settles down. As stability occurs in finite time, learning is incomplete and the convergence of outcomes to zero does not necessarily obtain. Almost surely, therefore, the policy that proves stable delivers an outcome divergent from the median voter's ideal.
Simulations
Several questions of interest are not accessible analytically. In this section I offer simulations of the dynamic policy making process that provide some additional insight. The model contains several parameters that can be varied in simulations. In a rough sense, what matters most is the complexity of the issue relative to the status quo outcome (increasing o sq is equivalent to decreasing issue complexity). For clarity and brevity, therefore, I focus the analysis on varying the status quo outcome and for all simulations fix μ = −1 and σ 2 = 4, such that α = 2.
19 Figure 4 displays the relative frequency of events that trigger stability. Primarily it establishes that getting stuck is a real possibility. For values of o sq close to the goodenough boundary policy making gets stuck almost half of the time, and for very large values of o sq it gets stuck at least 17% of the time. The figure also shows that the probability of reaching the triangulating phase is increasing in o sq , and that for large values of o sq a good-enough outcome in the triangulating phase is the predominant trigger of stability. Figure 5 reports on the policies that ultimately proved stable, depicting two related measures: the average utility loss for the median voter from the stable policy, and the distance of the policy from zero. The striking feature is that a better status quo does not lead to a more attractive stable policy -in fact, the opposite is generally true. Although surprising at first blush, it is the result of two intuitive factors. First, if policy starts at an outcome just beyond the good-enough boundary voters have a higher probability of observing an outcome inside [−α, α] but near the boundary and stopping there. Second, the relative attractiveness of the sq for lower o sq increases the frequency with which policy making gets stuck at sq. The relationship in Figure 5 is particularly interesting for what it implies about social welfare. To a social planner -who cares about all generations of voters -it implies that, for sufficient patience, social welfare is enhanced the worse the status quo policy. Turning this around, the relationship in the figure also provides a novel argument why it is efficient for policy reform to not begin until a "crisis" situation has been reached (see Drazen and Grilli 1993 for a discussion of this dynamic). 20 
Structural Uncertainty
Although voters face considerable difficulty in finding good policies, their task is simplified by knowledge of the underlying parameters of the policy process. In practice, they may lack even this much knowledge, facing what might be thought of as structural uncertainty. I show here how structural uncertainty can further constrain the willingness of voters to experiment with policy. For brevity I limit attention to the more interesting case of uncertainty over the drift parameter and present a partial characterization of behavior. I compare behavior from the benchmark model when drift is known to be μ to the case where citizens' prior beliefs ascribe equal probability to two values μ 1 < μ 2 that satisfy
= μ < 0 (uncertainty over drift is a mean-preserving spread around μ).
I begin with the first election. It was shown previously that with no uncertainty over drift the status quo is stable if o sq ≤ α and otherwise an experimental policy is chosen with an expected outcome α. With uncertainty over drift the first of these properties holds whereas the second does not. Instead, citizens are less bold when they do experiment, producing an expected outcome that is strictly more divergent than α.
Corollary 2 With drift uncertainty, the equilibrium strategy at t = 1 is:
(ii) Experimental if o sq > α, where Eψ (x * 1 |h t ) > α and strictly increasing in o sq .
At the sq policy, the expected marginal gain of experimentation is
, the same as when drift is known and this leads to the same stability cut-point. The equivalence breaks down, however, for positive levels of experimentation. The gain from the steeper possible drift value (μ 1 ) is tempered by the fact that if this is the true drift the expected outcome is already close to zero and the marginal gain is small. Although the reverse holds for the flatter drift μ 2 , the average of the two marginal gains leads to less experimentation.
In subsequent elections the effect of drift uncertainty is more subtle and substantial. Whereas with no drift uncertainty unfavorable outcomes are attributed to simple bad luck, they must now be interpreted for what they imply about drift. How extensively this inference problem affects behavior depends on whether uncertainty extends to the sign of the drift as well as the magnitude. I begin with μ 1 < μ 2 < 0 and behavior at the second election.
Corollary 3
With drift uncertainty and μ 1 < μ 2 < 0, the equilibrium strategy at t = 2 is in part:
Drift uncertainty produces contrasting effects on second period behavior, depending on the outcome realized after the first election. A bad outcome at t = 1 leads voters to assign more weight to μ 2 , rendering further experimentation less attractive and increasing voters' willingness to backslide to the sq policy. In contrast, a good outcome at t = 1 pushes more weight onto μ 1 , making further experimentation more attractive. Thus, policies that produce outcomes in a neighborhood of α -even outcomes closer to zero -are not stable. 21 Behavior is not so straightforward when μ 1 < 0 < μ 2 , although the relevance of this case to ideological policy making is unclear. It implies that citizens can order policies according to expectations but cannot identify which end of the policy spectrum delivers liberal outcomes and which end delivers conservative outcomes. Such extreme uncertainty could be relevant to some sorts of issues and when it is it leads to additional considerations. A sufficiently bad outcome may then cause voters to change beliefs as to which end of the policy spectrum is the liberal end, and when it does voters may reverse course and choose policies on the other side of the status quo (violating the precepts of the monotonic phase).
Regardless of the impact throughout the monotonic phase, drift uncertainty has no impact in the triangulating phase. At this point experimentation is on a bridge where the true drift is irrelevant to beliefs.
The Structure of Political Competition
Driving the results until now is a simple model of political competition. This has allowed a focus on learning in a complex environment, yet it leaves relatively unexplored the question of how political incentives interact with learning and experimentation. In this section I take an initial step in this direction by considering two simple extensions to the political environment. In both extensions I uncover novel effects on policy making. These effects emerge solely due to an imperfect understanding of the policy process, exposing the subtlety of experimentation in richer political contexts.
Preference Uncertainty
In practice candidates are unsure about the preferences of voters, and I amend the model as follows to incorporate this uncertainty. I suppose that in addition to policy, voters evaluate candidates on a non-policy valence component. Specifically, voter i's utility from policy p when offered by candidate J ∈ {X, Y } is:
be the difference in valence evaluations, where γ t is distributed symmetrically and with full support over [−λ, λ]. The valence evaluation γ t is common to all voters and a new γ t is drawn independently each period. Valence is not observed by candidates when choosing their policy positions. 22 Unless otherwise specified, set λ = ∞ such that both candidates have a positive probability of winning for any pair of platforms. Hereafter candidates care only about policy outcomes (κ = 0) and are equally impatient as voters. 23 Preference uncertainty adds 'noise' to the environment and may be expected to reduce the efficacy of policy making. This would be true were this a single-person decision problem. Yet it is not and the fact that it isn't now matters. The noise affects policy making by changing the strategic environment, and changing it in such a way that the efficacy of long-term policy making can actually be improved.
Preference uncertainty changes the strategic environment by 'smoothing out' the candidate payoff functions. Wittman (1983) and Calvert (1985) show that when the policy process is known this smoothness induces the candidates to diverge, offering platforms that are a compromise between their own most-preferred policy and that of 22 In a one period model Londregan and Romer (1993) interpret this as parties not knowing the valence of candidates they nominate to represent their position. Valence is independent across time if one thinks of parties nominating different candidates each period. 23 Equilibrium existence (in possibly mixed strategies) is assured by appropriately truncating the policy space and noting the utility of voters and candidates is continuous in policies (as the full support of γ t implies the probability of winning for each candidate is continuous). the median voter. 24 Similar incentives arise here and within each period the impact on policy making is negative. The median voter dislikes divergence as her favorite policy may no longer be implemented. Moreover, risk aversion implies that at least all voters to one side of the median also dislike divergence (and possibly all voters, as well as the candidates themselves).
Proposition 6 For any pair of platforms x t 6 = y t at election t, a strict majority of voters strictly prefer the convergent platforms
In a static model, or in a model with a known policy process, this is the only effect of divergence. The following results show how a benefit to divergence can emerge when efficacy is considered across periods and then only when the policy process is uncertain. First, however, I first present the surprising result that platforms do not always diverge under preference uncertainty when the policy process is uncertain. In fact, when the candidates fail to diverge, they converge to the median voter's most-preferred policy and behavior is identical to the baseline model. 25 This implies that the logic of Wittman and Calvert is weakened when policy is made under uncertainty.
Lemma 4 Equilibrium platforms converge, x * t = y * t , in equilibrium for some histories. They do so if and only if the candidates share a common most-preferred policy. The convergent policy must also be most-preferred by the median voter and have been previously tried (in h t ).
Driving this possibility is the distinction between outcome preferences and policy preferences. While candidates and the median voter differ in the former, they may align on the latter when knowledge of the policy process is imperfect. Thus, the candidates offer the median voter's most-preferred policy not because they must to win the election, but they do so because the policy is their most-preferred as well. Political agreement of this sort can occur only at a known point, and when it does it induces convergent stability.
The impact of preference uncertainty reduces, therefore, to two questions: How frequently do the candidates converge? And, what happens when they diverge? Lemma 5 addresses the first question, showing that in the monotonic phase convergent stability occurs for strictly fewer histories when the policy process is uncertain. Denote by z * t ∈ {x * t , y * t } the winning policy at election t, and retain the assumptions μ ≤ 0 and o sq ≥ 0.
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Lemma 5 In the monotonic phase convergent stability obtains only if:
Convergent stability can arise due to a good-enough outcome or by getting stuck. However, a good-enough outcome now requires an outcome within α of both candidates' ideal, and thus within α − d of zero (an impossibility when α < d). Getting stuck is also more difficult to obtain as candidate X (with ideal outcome −d) is less willing to backslide than would be the median voter.
For all other histories in the monotonic phase the candidates diverge, yet this by itself is not sufficient to ensure experimentation. It is possible for policy to stabilize with divergent platforms if both candidates locate at known points, what I refer to as divergent stability. In this case the policy choice is not constant -alternating between the candidates -yet nothing new is learned as the set of possible winning policies stabilizes. Nevertheless, in the monotonic phase divergent stability requires that one of the candidates stabilize at a policy with an outcome on the far side of zero from his ideal. This is sufficiently difficult to satisfy that in the monotonic phase preference uncertainty leads to strictly more experimentation. 27 Proposition 7 In the monotonic phase policy making stabilizes for strictly fewer histories when candidates are uncertain about voter preferences.
In the triangulating phase it is again the case that convergent stability obtains for strictly fewer histories. The candidates are unlikely to agree on a most-preferred policy when each knows of a policy that delivers an outcome on his side of zero. Lemma 6 states the necessary conditions. Define τ
as the most attractive outcomes realized up to election t on either side of zero (the previously defined τ * t is the policy among these two that is most attractive to the median voter).
Lemma 6
In the triangulating phase, convergent stability obtains only if the requirements of Propositions 3 and 4 are satisfied, d < max
(z * r − z * l ) for each spanning bridge.
The final condition on the width of the spanning bridge is of particular interest as once it is satisfied it is satisfied thereafter (the bridge can only narrow) and convergent stability is ruled out. Enough is known about the policy process at such a point for political agreement to be impossible. This contrasts with the baseline model where political agreement -convergent stability -is eventually obtained almost surely.
The final case -divergent stability in the triangulating phase -reveals the possible perniciousness of preference uncertainty and destroys the general claim that it necessarily improves experimentation. Example 1 generates divergent stability where it otherwise would not obtain in the baseline model. Thus, at times, preference uncertainty can actually reduce a society's willingness to experiment. In the example both candidates most prefer policies that are known whereas the median voter prefers experimenting further (as both known outcomes are more than α from 0). Each candidate could deviate and increase his probability of victory and without preference uncertainty he would do so. With preference uncertainty and λ large, however, a deviator wins election only marginally more frequently and this does not compensate for the cost of committing to a less attractive policy. Notably, this equilibrium -with candidates at their most-preferred policies -is possible precisely because the policy process is unknown. With a known mapping (and quadratic utility) the candidates would always have the incentive to creep in from their most-preferred policy toward the median voter.
Abstention and Experimentation
When turning out to vote is voluntary the median voter may differ from the median citizen and, more importantly, may vary from election to election. In this section I allow citizens the option to abstain and examine the impact on experimentation. For simplicity, assume there is a continuum of citizens, distributed according to the density function f , where f is symmetric around zero, has full support and is single-peaked, and return to the baseline model (with no valence term).
I suppose that citizens abstain from voting when they are sufficiently alienated from all candidates. That is, a citizen votes for her favorite candidate if that candidate is sufficiently attractive, otherwise she abstains due to alienation. Formally, citizens have a common tolerance level υ > 0 such that they vote for their favorite candidate if the utility from that candidate exceeds −υ. If no candidate meets this threshold a citizen abstains (full turnout corresponds to υ = ∞).
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The option to abstain means that how much voters like a candidate -and not just who they like -matters to behavior. Proposition 8 shows that at the first election this leads society toward the safety of the status quo and away from risk.
Proposition 8
With abstention, the equilibrium strategy at t = 1 is stable at x *
, where α υ = α for υ = ∞, α υ = ∞ for all υ ≤ α 2 , and
Driving this result is that the riskiness of experimenting reduces the utility of experimental policies. As a result abstention lowers turnout disproportionately for experimental policies, reducing a society's willingness to abandon a status quo. In fact, this reluctance can reach such a level that for even strictly positive levels of tolerance (υ ≤ α 2 ) the status quo is stable regardless of the outcome it produces.
Abstention continues to reduce experimentation throughout the monotonic phase, even growing in effect due to the possibility of getting stuck. This flight to safety persists into the triangulating phase and Proposition 9 establishes the general result that abstention biases society toward known -and riskless -policies.
Proposition 9
For each h t , there is a υ 0 > 0 such that policy τ * t is stable if υ ≤ υ 0 .
As tolerance decreases, therefore, the set of histories for which policy stabilizes strictly grows. Although a majority of citizens may be willing to experiment -and even agree on the direction to move -they may not be able to find a common policy for which they are all willing to turn out. This may go some way to explaining why a society's ability to change does not always match its desire to change.
Discussion
Winning Majorities. Obscured by the focus on the median voter is the composition of winning coalitions and how they vary across phases. In the monotonic phase a strict majority of voters agree that experimenting is the best course of action and agree on the direction to experiment with policy. Moreover, the same coalition holds throughout the phase -and carries the election each time -despite no two voters within the coalition agreeing as to their most-preferred policy (unless they share exactly an ideal outcome).
In contrast, the winning majority varies from period to period in the triangulating phase, and voters within each coalition may agree on their most-preferred policies. Also different is that a strict majority of voters may wish to not experiment. In fact, it could be only one voter -the median -who wishes to experiment further. Thus, for mature issues in the triangulating phase experimentation continues only as a compromise solution.
Course Reversals. The directional pattern of policy choice that emerges in equilibrium illuminates a debate in applied policy making on the wisdom of course reversals.
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This debate turns on the issue of how a policy failure should be interpreted. One view, often attributed to the IMF and World Bank, is that a policy failure is due only to insufficient application. As Clark (20007) critically phrases the view:
"If the medicine fails to cure, then the only possible conclusion is that more is needed."
The opposing view is that a policy failure reflects a mistaken choice of direction and should be immediately reversed. This view is satirized by Paul Krugman, who makes the case against knee-jerk course reversals by analogizing them as follows: My results provide a theoretical underpinning to this informal debate. In the monotonic phase a failure is indeed due to insufficient application, and in the triangulating phase failures are often caused by an over-shooting of the intended target. Yet even in these situations a reversal of policy is not always optimal. The results demonstrate why neither rule-of-thumb is universally applicable and show exactly when and why policy reversals are relevant.
Other Applications. That the baseline model reduces to a single person decision problem offers the advantage that the results are directly applicable to other settings. For example, the direction and distance of change are important in the search for a consumer product or a job (see Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright (2005) for a survey). To translate this model to labor market search, each policy may correspond to a particular job and outcomes represent the combination of pay and working conditions for that job. The job seeker has an ideal pay and working conditions combination, with outcomes above that level corresponding to a wage that is too low, and outcomes below that level to jobs requiring too many hours. The worker can order the jobs by expected outcome (as do voters with policies) but the realized job characteristics remain hidden until a job is tried.
Applied to this setting (with an ideal job outcome of zero), the results of Section 3 describe the dynamics of impatient job search and explain why workers may sometimes get stuck in unattractive jobs. Moreover, interpreting each policy as a job suggests some natural extensions. For instance, employers may advertise by revealing (perhaps noisily) the characteristics of their job with the hope of enticing workers to join their firm. The logic of advertising in this sense is not straightforward, however, as if the advertisement creates a Brownian bridge it may induce a worker to experiment -and take a new job -but with a firm other than the one advertising.
Conclusion
The importance of experimentation and learning to policy making has long been acknowledged in practice. This paper is an attempt to address these issues theoretically using a novel model of policy uncertainty. The objective is to provide insight into when policy makers experiment with policy and whether they are able to learn enough about a complex world to make policy effectively.
By necessity the model of politics developed here omits many features of practical relevance. The two simple extensions I consider are only a first step in understanding how political incentives interact with learning in a complex environment. Obvious next steps would explore the role of outside experts, bureaucrats, and the media in providing policy-relevant information, as well as the ability to learn about policy across a federal system. The framework introduced here offers the flexibility to address these and other questions, although they are beyond the scope of this paper and must be left for another time.
Differentiating:
As the second derivative is independent of z,
≤ 0 at z = x l implies x l is the optimal policy (as by construction u m (x l ) ≥ u m (x r )), regardless of the sign of
. Straightforward algebra establishes this is true iff ψ (x l ) ≤ α (x l |x r , ψ (x r )). An experimental policy is optimal when ψ (x l ) > α (x l |x r , ψ (x r )) and is found by rearranging dEu m (z) dz = 0, noting that the term in the square brackets is the expected value. ¥
Properties of experimenting on a bridge. Suppose z * ∈ (x l , x r ) is the optimal policy on the bridge d x l x r , and retain the assumption |ψ (x l )| ≤ |ψ (x r )|. The following properties of z * are useful:
equality holds in both iff
|ψ (x l )| = |ψ (x r )|).
Property ii: E £ ψ (z * ) |\ x l · x r ¤ < α (x l |x r , ψ (x r )). Property iii: E £ ψ (z * ) |\ x l · x r ¤ < α (z * |x r , ψ (x r )) < α (x l |x r , ψ (x r )).
Proof of Property i. Expected utility is quadratic across a bridge, the result follows from u m (x l ) ≥ u m (x r ). ¥ Proof of Property ii. Follows from the concavity of variance across the bridge and that the slope of d x l x r is increasing in x l . Formally, substituting E £ ψ (z 0 ) |\ x l · x r ¤ = α (x l |x r , ψ (x r )) into dEum(z) dz and simplifying gives:
x r − x l> 0, as the first bracketed term is greater than one and the second less than one (as ψ (x l ) > α (x l |x r , ψ (x r )) for experimentation to be optimal). Thus, z * > z 0 and the result follows from the negative slope of the bridge. ¥ Proof of Property iii. The first inequality is due to the concavity of variance across a bridge. The realization ψ (z * ) = E £ ψ (z * ) |\ x l · x r ¤ implies the spanning bridges at t and t + 1 have the same slope, but dvar ( ψ(z)| \ z * ·x r ) dz | z * = σ 2 whereas dvar ( ψ(z)| [ x l ·x r ) dz | z * < σ 2 , and the result follows by the continuity of utility. The second inequality holds because the t + 1 spanning bridge is steeper for the realization ψ (z * ) = α (x l |x r , ψ (x r )). Formally:
ψ(x r )−α(x l |x r ,ψ(x r )) xr−z * since x r − z * < x r − x l , and the inequality follows from optimal experimentation on a bridge. ¥
Proof of Lemma 1:
For an arbitrary policy p, expected utility varies across voters as follows (using the mean-variance representation; see p. 9): . As the lottery is non-degenerate, Eu m (x t , y t ) < Eu m (x * t , y * t ), and the result follows as the concavity in o i is independent of policies.¥ Proof of Lemma 4: Suppose policyp is most preferred by both candidates; that such ap is possible is shown in Lemma 5. If the median voter most prefers some q 6 =p, then as , which cannot be satisfied for d > 0; a contradiction. I now establish the equilibrium claim. The convergent platforms x * t = y * t =p constitute an equilibrium: a deviation by either candidate lowers the probability of winning (asp is the median's most preferred) and leads to strictly worse policy outcome (as λ has full support on R). Alternatively, x t 6 =p is not supportable in equilibrium as a deviation top increases X's probability of winning and strictly improves the policy outcome.
Finally, suppose x t = y t despite the candidate's not sharing a most-preferred policy. Thus, one candidate is not located at his ideal; let this be candidate X. A deviation by X to his most-preferred policy is profitable as κ = 0 and he still wins with positive probability (full support of λ). ¥ Proof of Lemma 5: From Lemma 4 and Proposition 2, convergent stability obtains only if candidate X finds a good-enough outcome or gets stuck. The first condition follows from Proposition 2. The second holds if X most prefers policy τ * t , which requires:
Substituting σ 2 −μ = 2α and rearranging gives the required condition. ¥ Proof of Proposition 7: Divergent stability requires that the median voter's mostpreferred policy is known. Suppose not and that the median most prefers experimental policy p 0 . As
= −2 for all p, candidate X prefers p 0 over his platform. As deviating to p 0 increases X's probability of winning, it is profitable; a contradiction.
As this condition is sufficient for stability in the baseline model, the result follows from Lemma 5 and the observation that for o sq ∈ (α − d, α] policy stabilizes in the baseline model at t = 1 but not under preference uncertainty. ¥ Proof of Lemma 6: From the proof of Lemma 4 convergent stability can only be at the median voter's most-preferred policy and the requirements of Propositions 3 and 4 must be satisfied. As the stable policy must be a known point, the median's preferred
